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Abstract 
This paper compares the content of performance contracts in Danish central government 
over time in order to identify whether – and if so, how – it develops. The analysis is con-
ducted as a two-step, mixed methods study. First, a quantitative study was carried out based 
on a study of all performance contracts in Danish central government in 2002, 2006, 2009, 
2012 and 2014. For each year, all performance contracts have been coded according to the 
number and type of targets included in them. A range of qualitative interviews was then 
carried out, and Ministry of Finance recommendations were consulted to improve the un-
derstanding of the results of the quantitative analysis and development patterns. The paper 
finds a general decrease in the number of performance targets per contract and a change in 
the relative share of different types of targets over time. During the period under study, the 
share of outcomes has increased, activity-oriented targets have decreased, and targets for 
internal management decreased in the mid-2000s before again increasing more recently. 
On this basis, performance contracting in Danish central government is argued to have en-
tered a third generation. 
 
Introduction 
Management by Objectives and Results (MBOR) and performance contracting 
were adopted in central government in Denmark in the 1980s and early 1990s 
(Kristiansen, 2015), and it is now possible to critically examine how the system 
has evolved over time.  
Already in the early years of the performance movement, Pollitt (1989) ob-
served that performance management systems might change over time. Since then, 
various researchers and practitioners have made numerous observations about the 
dynamics involved. One of these dynamics is how performance management sys-
tems tend to escalate over time. De Bruijn (2007), for instance, argues that perfor-
mance management systems tend to inflate over time through the ‘law of mush-
rooming’. Similarly, Pollitt (2013: 353) points out the notion of a ‘logic of esca-
lation’ that is characterised by, among other things, performance management be-
coming increasingly technically complex and expansive (and ultimately costly) as 
well as increasingly control-focused. 
In the Danish context, Binderkrantz and Christensen (2009) have analysed the 
development of the contract content for central government agencies over time. 
Their study outlines a development process that mirrors the notion of a logic of 
escalation quite closely, as the numbers of targets in the contracts tend to inflate. 
The question is, however, whether it is possible to change and reverse this dy-
namic. The Binderkrantz and Christensen (2009) analysis builds on data that is 
more than 10 years old. The context has changed considerably, as Denmark, like 
other countries, was hit by the global financial crisis, resulting in pressure on pub-
lic finances, cutbacks and new and changed accountability systems 
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for budgeting, spending controls and financial management (Hansen & Kristian-
sen, 2014a,b). Moreover, actors involved in performance contracting have ac-
quired further experience with the system, and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) has 
published new recommendations for its implementation (Finansministeriet, 2010; 
2014). This provides reason to examine whether and how the content of perfor-
mance contracts has developed in recent years and scrutinising the dynamics of 
the development patterns. 
More specifically, there is an examination into whether contracts become sim-
pler over time (containing fewer performance targets) or more comprehensive 
(containing more performance targets), and whether their content is refocused by 
changing the relative share of different types of performance targets (activities, 
outputs, quality, outcomes, productivity or internal management) over time. In 
other words, the examination focuses on whether some types of performance tar-
gets become more popular over time at the expense of others.  
In order to identify continuity or change in the content of the performance 
contracts, the paper compares contract content over time (diachronic compari-
sons). The analysis is conducted as a mixed methods study in two steps. First, a 
quantitative study was carried out based on a study of all performance contracts 
in Danish central government in 2002, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2014. For each year, 
all performance contracts have been coded according to the number and type of 
targets included in them. A range of qualitative interviews was then carried out, 
and historical MoF recommendations were consulted in order to improve the un-
derstanding of the results of the quantitative analysis and the development pat-
terns. 
The paper shows a general decrease in the number of performance targets per 
contract in the period studied; at the same time, it shows how the relative share of 
different types of targets changes over time. The share of outcomes has increased 
during the period studied, whereas the share of targets oriented towards internal 
management fell in the mid-2000s, increasing again in recent years. The study 
thus illustrates how the content of performance contracts is open to adjustments 
and gradually changes over time. Based on these findings, it is argued that Danish 
central government is now facing a third generation of performance contracting. 
The paper is structured in six sections. In section 2, MBOR and performance 
contracting in Danish central government are presented. The theoretical frame-
work is sketched out in section 3 and the research methodology in section 4. Sec-
tion 5 holds the analysis of the content of performance contracts over time, while 
the sixth section discusses how the development patterns might be interpreted on 
the basis of a historical institutional framework. The results of the analysis are 
discussed and conclusions are drawn in section 7. 
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MBOR and performance contracting in Danish central gov-
ernment 
The origins of MBOR can be traced back to the mid-1980s (possibly even earlier), 
when Management by Objectives was introduced together with a budget reform. 
Through this reform, agencies gained more autonomy but were obliged to manage 
their activities towards specific goals. In the early 1990s, the Danish MoF initiated 
an experiment with performance contracts as a new accountability arrangement 
between parent ministries and their agencies. In 1992, the first seven contracts 
(‘free agencies’) were established in a pilot project. The MoF initially played a 
decisive role in setting up the contracts and determining the contractual relations; 
later it withdrew. Performance contracting was not mandatory, so the MoF had to 
persuade departments and agencies to join the scheme. In the early 1990s, the MoF 
issued a ‘budget guarantee’ to all of the agencies that were willing to join (Finans-
ministeriet, 1995; Binderkrantz & Christensen, 2009), but this was later aban-
doned (Kristiansen, 2015: 552). Due to its optional status, performance contract-
ing was relatively slow-developing in the early years. It thereafter spread and con-
tracts became institutionalised in the early 2000s and are now nearly universally 
adopted in central government (Binderkrantz & Christensen, 2009: 55; Kristian-
sen, 2015). 
The MoF is now solely responsible for maintaining the system, including set-
ting requirements and recommendations for the design and use of performance 
contracts. Thus, since the introduction of the contracts, the MoF and agencies 
within it (e.g. the Agency for Modernization) have continuously launched new 
regulations and reports containing recommendations related to their implementa-
tion. 
Based on these recommendations, various interventions have been added to 
the original performance contracting system over time. In 1995, performance con-
tracts for chief executives in the agencies related to performance-related pay were 
introduced as a pilot project, becoming permanent in 1997. In 1996, a committee 
of public managers completed a report in which it was stated that the decentrali-
sation of budget responsibility had gone too far and more central control was 
needed. The report recommended ‘enterprise accounts’ (later, annual reports) as a 
useful tool in the performance-controlling process. In 1997, ‘enterprise accounts’ 
became mandatory. Over time, the use of the MBOR system in the Danish central 
government has escalated. In the beginning, a simple system was established. Per-
formance contracts were later introduced, the focus on performance control was 
intensified, and performance was to be reported in annual reports, thereby also 
rendering MBOR an external steering tool. MBOR escalates, in other words, and 
the system becomes more sophisticated, detailed and comprehensive, as well as 
more control-oriented (Kristiansen, 2015). 
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Escalations of the institutional elements related to the MBOR system seem to 
have been reflected in a similar escalation process in the contract content. Building 
on an analysis of contracts in 1995, 2000 and 2005, Binderkrantz and Christensen 
(2009: 55) have shown how the early contracts (first generation) were quid pro 
quo agreements, as agencies committed themselves to improving efficiency while 
simultaneously increasing managerial discretion (Greve, 2000). Departmental 
ministries later formulated targets related to policy and service levels rather than 
internal management. During the 10-year period from 1995 to 2005, Binderkrantz 
and Christensen (2009: 66) show how the number of performance targets per con-
tract almost doubled (second generation). The 1995 contracts included on average 
20 targets, while those for 2005 averaged 37. On the basis of these conclusions, it 
is interesting to examine whether and how the content of the performance con-
tracts has developed in recent years. 
 
Analytical framework: Institutional dynamics 
The dynamics in performance management systems are well known, including 
escalation over time. Based on a historical institutional perspective, institutional 
dynamics and the mechanisms that potentially might result in escalation and/or 
de-escalation are unfolded in this section. 
Institutional development processes are often analysed on the basis of histor-
ical institutional perspectives emphasising path dependence (e.g. Pierson, 2000, 
2004; Mahoney, 2000; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Pierson (2000: 252) defines 
path dependence as ‘social processes that exhibit increasing returns’. In this def-
inition, steps in a particular direction lead to further movement in the same direc-
tion. In this perspective, changes occur in critical junctures, which are described 
as when: ‘Political life is punctuated by critical moments or junctures that shape 
the basic contours of social life’ (Pierson, 2000: 251).  
Streeck and Thelen (2005: 8) criticise such path dependent models, however, 
arguing that too much of the institutional literature relies on punctuated equilib-
rium models that draw a sharp distinction between long periods of institutional 
stability periodically interrupted by exogenous shocks that open things up, allow-
ing for radical change (see also Kristiansen, 2015: 545). They argue that an insti-
tution such as performance contracting is defined by 
 
‘is defined by continuous interaction between rule makers and rule tak-
ers during which ever new interpretations of the rule will be discov-
ered, invented suggested, rejected or for the time being adopted’.  
 
Institutions are thus continuously created and recreated by a great number of ac-
tors with divergent interests, varying normative commitments, different powers 
and limited cognition (Streeck & Thelen, 2005: 16). 
Related to performance contracting in Denmark, the MoF functions as the 
guiding authority (the ‘rule maker’). Formal requirements related to performance 
contracting in Danish central government are very few and very general (see Mod-
erniseringsstyrelsen, 2014), however, and MoF publications concerning MBOR 
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and performance contracting primarily contain recommendations and only very 
few direct requirements. These recommendations might, however, be perceived 
as requirements or directives by the rule-takers, especially as the National Audit 
Office often bases its audits on the MoF recommendations. 
Another way to interpret the dynamics of performance contracting might be 
to view events as cyclic, as between decentralisation and centralisation, manage-
rial autonomy and tightening accountability, coordination and specialisation (see 
e.g. Aucoin, 1990). Cycles might primarily be related to specific conditions, such 
as the absence of any stable, generally accepted design principles and a limited 
number of apparent options (each containing significant advantages and disad-
vantages). Cycles may also take place within an overall path and could be com-
bined with a long-term trend (Pollitt, 2008: 58) towards, for example, institution-
alisation, sophistication or professionalisation. According to Pollitt (2008: 53), the 
underlying mechanism of cycles might be that, in a highly uncertain world where 
there are no firm rules as to the best solution, organisational designers tend to opt 
for one set of forms until their particular disadvantages become apparent, where-
upon they begin looking for opportunities to move towards a different form that 
reduces these disadvantages. The cost hereof is the introduction of other kinds of 
drawbacks. Over time, reformers will therefore swing between alternatives, each 
of which carries advantages and disadvantages. 
These adjustments and changes can be seen as resulting from rational deci-
sions taken in order to solve problems when reformers in some kind of single-loop 
learning have learned that the existing management tool is no longer optimal (Ar-
gyris & Schön, 1978). Changes, however, might also be affected by new manage-
ment ideas popping up and exerting pressure to adapt to these socially created 
norms in order to receive legitimacy and support (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMag-
gio & Powell, 1983). 
 
Research methodology 
The paper compares the content of performance contracts in Danish central gov-
ernment (diachronic comparisons) in order to identify whether and how it devel-
ops. More specifically, the number and types of performance targets in the con-
tracts are analysed over time. 
The primary empirical basis of the paper comprises a study of all performance 
contracts in Danish central government for the years 2002, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 
2014. The years included in the study were selected because data was available 
for these specific years. The MoF and/or Agency for Modernization1 have col-
lected and coded performance contracts in 2002, 2006, 2009 and 2012. For the 
year 2014, data was collected and coded by the author of this paper and a research 
assistant using the same coding scheme and same population of central govern-
ment agencies and state institutions. Although the selection of these years might 
appear to be a rather pragmatic approach, it provides opportunity to analyse the 
development patterns in the contract content over a time series with maximum 4-
year intervals. 
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Efficiency/productivity 
Another aim of this study is to discuss how the development patterns can be 
interpreted. MoF reports have been consulted to analyse whether changes in con-
tract content match its recommendations. A range of interviews was carried out in 
2014-15 with policy makers in the MoF and actors involved in formulating per-
formance contracts in ministries and agencies in order to gain a better understand-
ing of the mechanisms leading to changes in the contract content over time. 
 
Operationalisation of the dependent variables and measurement 
The performance contracts have been coded according to the number and type of 
performance targets included in them. ‘Number of targets per contract’ is simply 
a count of all performance targets in a performance contract for a given year. A 
performance target is: ‘measurable and restricted in terms of time. The measure-
ment of a performance target is used as documentation for the fulfilment of a goal’ 
(Moderniseringsstyrelsen, 2013b: 1). 
‘Type of performance targets’ measures the relative share of different types 
of performance targets in the contracts. It focuses on which dimensions of perfor-
mance are measured, as a target can capture different aspects, such as activities, 
output and outcome, and efficiency/productivity. Figure 1 shows a somewhat 
standard approach to classifying the stages in the public-sector production process. 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Production process 
Source: Based on OECD (2009: 17) 
 
Related to this production process model, the performance contracts have been 
coded according to the type of targets included in the contracts. We distinguished 
between seven types of performance targets in the contracts presented in Table 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Input 
Institutional/  
managerial 
arrangements 
 
Activities 
 
Outputs 
 
Outcomes 
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Table 1: Types of performance targets 
 Types of 
targets 
Definition and examples  
 Internal  
manage-
ment  
Targets related to the internal relations in the organisations 
(e.g. rate of sick leave, employee satisfaction, financial 
management and budget compliance, reorganisation and 
process optimisation). 
 
 Activities An action or group of actions contributing to the production 
of a product or a service (e.g. compose a law draft, plan a 
conference, evaluate a programme). 
 
Output  
(Quantity) 
 
The services/products the organisation delivers to its envi-
ronment. Outputs are the means used to affect the society 
or specific users/citizens (e.g. number of inspections carried 
out, number of research publications published). 
Quality Targets related to the quality of outputs such as user satis-
faction or the satisfaction of a parent ministry with the 
agency’s service of the minister. 
 Case  
processing 
time 
Case processing time refers to a specific quality dimension 
of an output and includes targets oriented towards, for ex-
ample, time spent on a case. 
 
 Productiv-
ity  
 
Financial inputs/resources spent on an activity, a service or 
a product. The cost of producing a given output (e.g. the 
costs of a control/inspection or the costs of processing a 
case). 
 
 Outcome  The effects/impacts the organisation strives to obtain in the 
environment through outputs. Outcomes might be either in-
termediate (e.g. new knowledge, improvement of skills, 
changed behaviour etc.) or final outcomes (e.g. better edu-
cated students, improved competitiveness, healthy patients, 
more enlightened citizens). 
 
Source: Developed on the basis of Økonomistyrelsen (2010; 2011) and Moderniseringsstyrelsen 
(2013b) 
 
Although these dimensions vary slightly from previous studies of performance 
targets (e.g. Askim, 2015; Binderkrantz & Christensen, 2009), they generally re-
flect the different dimensions of the production process presented in Figure 1. As 
the previous codes provided by the MoF were based on these dimensions, they 
were also used as the basis for the coding of the 2014 contracts in order to compare 
data over time. 
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Research strategy 
As the primary purpose of the paper is to reveal trends in the development patterns 
of contract content over time, the analysis is primarily based on descriptive statis-
tics in which the number and types of targets are presented for each year and com-
pared and contrasted to the remaining years included in the analysis. Inferential 
statistical analyses carried out using z-tests are applied to measure whether the 
difference found between two scores (e.g. the share of outcomes in 2006 and 2009) 
is systematic and unlikely to be caused by random factors (van Thiel, 2014: 128). 
Z-tests are selected as they have a critical value for each significance level (e.g. 
1.96 for 5% two-tailed) and because the sample size is large. The development 
patterns were then matched with MoF recommendations, and interviews with cen-
tral actors in central government were coded and interpreted in order to grasp the 
underlying mechanisms leading to changes in the contract content. Quotations are 
used in the analysis in order to interpret the identified development patterns. With 
the exception of MoF informants, the informants are quoted anonymously and 
listed as R1, R2, etc. 
 
Data quality: Reliability and consistency of the data 
To ensure reliability, clear definitions of what is meant by a performance target 
and the different types of them were established (see Table 1 above). Moreover, 
attempt was made to establish reliability by ensuring the replication of the same 
coding scheme as used in previous MoF studies. Historically, however, changes 
have been made to the coding scheme on a few occasions, which might affect the 
accuracy of the measurements over time. Before 2009, activities and outputs were 
all coded as outputs. In 2009, activities and outputs were split up and coded as two 
separate categories. In 2002 and 2006, a category termed ‘others’ was also used 
in the coding scheme. In 2006, in particular, many of the performance targets were 
coded in this category, which might affect the accuracy of the data. A category 
entitled ‘external development’ was also included in the coding scheme in 2002, 
2006 and 2009. ‘External development’ was defined as: ‘Development projects 
[...] where it appears as though the task is related to the fulfilment of external 
demands to the agency e.g. from the ministry, EU requirements or legislation’ 
(Økonomistyrelsen, 2010: 16). ‘External development’ is therefore interpreted as 
being quite similar to ‘activities’. These changes to the coding scheme over time 
affect the accuracy of the measurements and how correctly and precisely the var-
iables are captured. 
Although the codes are based on a clear coding list, much of the interpretation 
relates to the categorisation of a target. What counts as a performance target and 
how can one precisely distinguish between their different types? In other words, 
there might be cases in which it can be difficult to decide whether a range of de-
mands related to the same target should be counted as one performance target or 
as several. In other cases, it can be difficult to determine precisely whether a per-
formance target should be categorised as an activity or an output etc. It is therefore 
difficult to attain consistent measurements, especially as the study is based on a 
time series of data consisting partly of data collected by the author of the paper 
A Third Generation of Performance Contracting in Danish Central Government? 
 
 
 
57 
and partly by data collected and coded by the MoF. Different coders have there-
fore been involved over time, which might affect the consistency in a negative 
direction.2 
As the MoF studies have been replicated in order to establish time series, we 
have sought to enhance the reliability of the research in various ways. First, we 
have based our measurement on the MoF coding scheme. Second, we have dis-
cussed ambiguous cases with MoF coders (although different MoF coders have 
been involved over the years). The same person was involved in the coding of 
performance contracts for 2009 and 2012, whereas those responsible for the cod-
ing of the 2002 and 2006 performance contracts are unknown. Third, two inde-
pendent coders have coded performance contracts for 2014 in order to ensure the 
reliability and consistency of the codes. 
While considerable effort has been made to ensure reliability, data might suf-
fer both from accuracy and consistency problems, which obviously limits the re-
search. Despite these data problems, the dataset still seems appropriate for meeting 
the primary purpose of this study: to illustrate the overall development patterns 
and trends in the content of the contracts over time. 
 
Changes in contract content over time 
We will now examine the number of performance targets in the contracts and the 
types of targets that have dominated over time. 
 
How does the number of performance targets per contract develop over 
time? 
As Table 2 shows, the number of performance targets per performance contract 
decreases over the period studied, halving from 37.3 in 2002 to 18.6 in 2014.  
 
Table 2: Number of performance targets in the performance contracts over time 
  2002 2006 2009 2012 2014 
Number of performance con-
tracts 
140 111 121 108 103 
Number of performance targets 5219 3381 3058 2002 1916 
Number of performance targets 
per performance contract 
37.3 30.5 25.3 18.5 18.6 
 
Table 2 also shows a decrease in the number of performance contracts coded since 
2002. This is not the result of agencies dispensing with performance contracting 
but rather because of a decreasing total population of agencies and state institu-
tions in recent years. 
 
Which specific types of performance targets dominate over time? 
Table 3 below shows how performance targets regarding activities and outputs 
have dominated the entire period. Before 2009, activities and outputs were all 
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coded as outputs, whereas they have been coded as two separate categories since 
2009, which reflects how activities were the dominant type of performance targets. 
 
Table 3: Share of specific types of performance targets over time 
  2002 2006 2009 2012 2014 
Case processing time 7% 8% 1% 9% 7% 
Productivity 2% 3% 3% 2% 2% 
Activity - - 49% 41% 34% 
Output 36% 48% 11% 13% 16% 
Quality 5% 13% 15% 8% 14% 
Outcome 0% 4% 15% 18% 15% 
External development 5% 1% 3% - - 
Internal management 40% 14% 3% 10% 13% 
Others 5% 10% - - - 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
While activities have been the dominant type of performance target over time, 
their share has been decreasing since 2009 (from 49% in 2009 to 34% in 2014), 
and the share of activity-oriented targets is statistically significantly lower in 2014 
than in 2009.3 At the same time, the number and share of outcomes has increased, 
especially from 2006 to 2009. Statistically speaking, the share of outcome-ori-
ented targets is significantly larger in 2009 than in 2006.4 The share of outcomes 
also increases from 2009 to 2012, but if we examine the total number of outcomes 
in the performance contracts (see Table X in the appendix), it would appear to 
have peaked in 2009. After 2009, the increasing share of outcomes relative to other 
types of targets is primarily caused by a general decrease in the total number of 
performance targets across the contracts studied. From 2012 to 2014, a smaller 
drop in the share of outcomes is observed. 
Whereas the share of outcomes increases from 2002 to 2012, the share of 
productivity-oriented targets does not differ statistically significantly between 
2002 and 20145 and they are present in the contracts to a very limited degree. 
Another trend in the development pattern is an increasing number and share 
of targets focusing on internal management from 2009 to 2014. Statistically speak-
ing, the share of targets oriented towards internal management is thus significantly 
greater in 2014 than in 2009.6 After a dramatic and statistically significant drop in 
the share of this type of targets from 2002 to 2009,7 the relative share has been 
increasing since 2009. This has primarily been related to an increase in the targets 
for financial management and budget compliance, especially the precision of the 
agencies’ spending forecasts.  
In Figure 2 below, the general development process for central government is 
illustrated by scrutinising the performance contracts for the Danish Veterinary and 
Food Administration in the period under study. Figure 2 shows a dramatic fall in 
the number of targets per contract, from 95 in 2002 to 25 in 2014. Moreover, the 
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figure shows how the number of targets for outcomes increases, whereas the num-
ber of activity-oriented targets decreases. Figure 2 also reveals a dramatic decrease 
in the number of targets for internal management from 2002 to 2006. Contrary to 
the general picture in central government, however, the number of targets for in-
ternal management has been quite stable since 2006. 
 
Figure 2: Contract content for the Danish Veterinary and Food Administration 
over time 
 
Interpretation of development patterns 
This section digs deeper into the main findings in the analysis and discusses how 
the development patterns can be interpreted and understood. 
 
Number of performance targets over time 
The analysis found a general decrease in the number of performance targets per 
contract over time. Whereas Binderkrantz and Christensen (2009: 66) showed how 
the number of performance targets in contracts had almost doubled from 1995 to 
2005, this study demonstrates that it was cut in half from 2002 to 2014. The de-
velopment process thus appears to be characterised by a somewhat cyclical pattern 
Performance contract 2002: 32 pages and 5-page appendix. 
The contract contains 95 performance targets: activities (22), outputs 
(30), productivity (3), quality (4) and internal management (38). 
Performance contract 2006: 15 pages and 3-page appendix. 
The contract contains 64 performance targets: activities (26), outputs 
(21), quality (2), case processing time (7) and internal management (8). 
Performance contract 2009: 18 pages and 3-page appendix. 
The contract contains 44 performance targets: activities (19), outputs 
(13), outcomes (6), quality (7) and internal management (9). 
Performance contract 2012: 12 pages. 
The contract contains 21 performance targets: activities (1); outputs (3), 
outcomes (5), quality (4), productivity (1) and internal management (5). 
Performance contract 2014: 13 pages. 
The contract contains 25 performance targets: activities (4), outputs (1), 
outcomes (7), quality (5), productivity (3), case processing time (1) and 
internal management (4). 
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as the number of targets per contract escalates for a period until they start de-
escalating in the mid-2000s. In other words, the pendulum swings (Aucoin, 1990) 
from a limited number of targets per contract to very comprehensive contracts 
containing a large number of targets – and back again towards simpler contracts 
containing fewer of them. 
The decreasing number of performance targets becomes particularly evident 
in the dramatic fall in the number of targets for ‘internal management’ from 2002 
to 2006. These changes reflect recommendations from the MoF. In 2003, it pub-
lished a new report (Finansministeriet, 2003) in which the primary recommenda-
tion was that performance contracts should focus more on external directed tar-
gets8 (Finansministeriet, 2003: 37). 
In the early and mid-2000s, MBOR was exposed to extensive criticism, as it 
was argued that it was excessively comprehensive and detailed (see, e.g., Gjørup 
et al., 2007). At the end of 2007, a working group in the Danish MoF started col-
lecting experiences with MBOR from central government departments and agen-
cies. Based on this work, a report was published in the beginning of 2010 (Finans-
ministeriet, 2010), which abolished some of the previous demands according to a 
deregulation agenda (Finansminsteriet, 2010: 5) and recommended that perfor-
mance contracts should now focus on a few, strategically important goals (Kristi-
ansen, 2015: 555). Previous MoF reports had recommended that performance tar-
gets should cover all agency activities (see, e.g., Finansministeriet, 2000) in order 
to avoid measure-fixation. The priority now became avoiding target inflation and 
red tape. This focus on contracts with fewer targets was also emphasised in a re-
cent MoF report (2014), which was issued in an attempt to solve observed prob-
lems with the existing system. As one MoF policymaker explained: 
 
‘We had observed a tendency to target inflation in the contracts, as the 
agencies tried to cover their entire task portfolio […] The contracts had 
to serve too many purposes at the same time, meaning they weren’t 
sufficiently focused on the strategy and core agency tasks. We [the 
MoF] therefore started an analysis of the contracts. We measured the 
number of targets in the contracts and carried out a range of interviews 
with practitioners and top managers [head of secretaries and managing 
directors], researchers and consultants. Based on this work, we have 
launched this new model’ (Manager, MoF). 
 
The latest report from the MoF thus recommends an even further simplification of 
the contracts containing few (maximum 5–10) targets. Some (1–3) of these targets 
may be oriented towards internal management (Finansministeriet, 2014). These 
adjustments and changes mean that the performance contract regime de-escalates 
at the same time as it seems to become more standardised as more clear require-
ments are presented. These changes are stated as being a response to the problems 
experienced. Similar explanations appear in the interviews with actors in the min-
istries and agencies: 
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‘This exercise with restructuring the performance contract regime to-
wards fewer targets is very important in order to draw attention to the 
main purpose of our steering documents. So I think there has been an 
admission that it must be optimised; but when you look across central 
government, it’s clear that it [the trend towards fewer targets] comes 
from the Agency for Modernization’ (R1). 
 
‘I totally go along with the Agency for Modernization’s thoughts about 
fewer targets […] I think you have to admit that it [performance con-
tracting] is derailed and that it’s uninteresting for the top management 
in central government’ (R3). 
  
The development pattern for the number of targets per contract thus seems to re-
flect the general impression that performance contracting has become excessively 
comprehensive, which would appear to be reflected in new MoF and Agency for 
Modernization recommendations. The importance of the MoF recommendations 
is also seen in how many of the performance contracts contain statements an-
nouncing that: ‘This contract is composed on the basis of the Ministry of Finance’s 
recommendations’. Over time, the MoF recommendations (and agencies within it) 
have shifted from focusing on autonomy and a simple MBOR system in the early 
years towards increased control and a more sophisticated, detailed and compre-
hensive system in the late 1990s – and then back towards a simpler one in recent 
years emphasising fewer targets in the contracts (Kristiansen, 2015). As the anal-
ysis shows, the content of the contracts takes almost the same development pat-
tern. 
 
Types of performance targets dominating over time 
Upon examining the specific targets in the contracts, the analysis revealed an in-
creasing share of outcomes since 2006, whereas the share of activities in the same 
period decreased. In other words, outcome-oriented targets become popular in 
Danish central government (or actually in the entire public sector in Denmark) in 
this period. This possibly also reflects recommendations towards an increased fo-
cus on outcomes from the MoF (Finansministeriet, 2010) and the National Audit 
Office (2009). Outcome-oriented targets instead of detailed targets oriented to-
wards activities were seen as a means with which to enhance the managerial free-
dom of agencies and state institutions (Finansministeriet, 2010: 22) and to solve a 
problem with contracts containing too many and too detailed targets. 
 
The main increase in the share of outcomes appears from 2006 to 2009, before the 
MoF (Finansministeriet, 2010) and the National Audit Office (Rigsrevisionen, 
2009) published their recommendations. However, most ministries were already 
aware of the MoF (Finansministeriet, 2010) conclusions in early 2008. Further-
more, numerous actors promoted the idea of focusing on outcome-oriented targets 
in this period. Consultancies arranged conferences, wrote articles and books, and 
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invited senior public managers on study trips in order to promote outcome-based 
management (DJØF-bladet, 2005a,b; Ejler et al., 2008). Internationally, outcome-
based management was also at the top of the performance management agenda at 
this time (Department of Treasury and Finance Government of Western Australia, 
2004; Heinrich, 2002; Cook, 2004) and was promoted by the OECD (Kristensen, 
Groszyk & Bühler, 2002; Webber, 2004). In that sense, the recommendations 
made by the MoF and the National Audit Office in 2009 and 2010 simply reflected 
the already institutionalised norms for the ‘correct’ way of doing MBOR (or per-
formance management in general) and a practice already implemented by front-
runner ministries. 
The analysis also showed that after a decrease in the share of targets for inter-
nal management from 2002 to 2009, their share again increased from 2009 to 
2014. This was primarily caused by an increase in targets focusing on financial 
management and budget compliance, including the precision of the agency spend-
ing forecasts. A somehow cyclical development pattern is again observed, in 
which the purpose of performance contracting is converted over time. In the early 
years, contracts were used for organisational development. After the MoF with-
drew from the negotiations in the following years, performance contracting be-
came more common and was extended to almost all agencies and state institutions 
in central government; they had to implement it into their existing steering. As one 
of the informants with many years of experience with performance contracting 
explained, this resulted in contracts being formulated on the basis of existing steer-
ing documents, such as action plans that largely focused on internal management: 
 
‘We didn’t knew any better at the time. We used the steering docu-
ments they [agencies and state institutions] already had. They were ac-
tion plans. Then we removed a few things from them and made them 
into performance contracts. It became very detailed […] and created a 
bad steering dialogue, because you end up talking about what you have 
agreed upon – not what you think is important’ (R2). 
 
In 2003, the MoF recommended that the focus should be on externally directed 
targets, partly because they are more interesting for stakeholders than internally 
directed targets (Finansministeriet, 2003: 39). Targets for internal management 
have been promoted again in recent years, as the MoF and Agency for Moderni-
zation have increased their focus on precision in the agency spending forecasts 
with the project ‘Sound financial management in central government’ (Moderni-
seringsstyrelsen, 2011; 2012; 2013a). This might therefore be interpreted as an 
adaptation to new MoF recommendations and increasing focus on the importance 
of financial management. This is further supported by numerous explicit refer-
ences to the aforementioned ‘[s]ound financial management’ project in relation to 
targets for spending forecasts in the contracts. 
Summing up, the analysis shows how performance contracting – like other 
institutions – is open for adjustments and is continuously interpreted and recreated 
by rule makers and rule takers in the light of experiences, new trends and agendas. 
Changes in the content of the contracts largely reflect recommendations made by 
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the MoF that appear to be the main driver. The MoF bases its recommendations 
on experiences from the ministries and agencies, however, some of which appear 
to be first movers inspiring the MoF recommendations, whereas others might be 
followers or might be inspired by and imitate first movers. The process by which 
ministries are inspired by and imitate other ministries is illustrated in this quote 
from a civil servant responsible for the formulation of performance contracts in a 
ministry: 
 
‘The new model was presented by the Agency for Modernization [and] 
there was also presentation of how some agencies worked with this 
[…] Together with Ministry X […] which is well ahead on this subject, 
we were involved in a pilot project from which I got some inspiration. 
Other [ministries] have contacted us and asked how we’re working 
with this’ (R1). 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
This paper examined whether and how the content (number and types of targets) 
of performance contracts have developed over time, including discussion of how 
the development patterns can be interpreted. 
The analysis found a general decrease in the number of performance targets 
per contract in the period studied. Contrary to dynamics described as a ‘logic of 
escalation’ or ‘law of mushrooming’ in which performance management systems 
grow over time, this study has indicated how this dynamic may be reversed and 
how a de-escalation process might come about. 
At the same time, the analysis showed how the relative share of different types 
of targets changes over time: As the share of outcomes has increased, the share of 
activities has decreased; whereas the share of targets oriented towards internal 
management decreased in the mid-2000s, only to increase again more recently. 
The study has illustrated how the content of performance contracts is open to 
adjustments and gradually changes over time. The development pattern of the con-
tent is characterised by cycles: from simpler to more comprehensive contracts – 
and back again towards less comprehensive contracts. It also evolves from an in-
ternal focus to abolishing internal targets and back again to a situation where tar-
gets for internal management are seen as an appropriate part of the contracts (but 
only as a supplement to externally oriented targets related to core agency tasks). 
These cycles occur within an overall path of performance contracting as a well-
institutionalised feature of central government management and are combined 
with a long-term trend towards the further sophistication, professionalisation and 
standardisation of performance contracting in Danish central government. Thus, 
through gradual changes, performance contracting in Danish central government 
has changed over time. The question now becomes whether we are now facing the 
third generation of performance contracting in central government in Denmark. 
In the early 1990s, contracts remained close to the general MoF guidelines. 
Agencies had to live up to a range of targets focusing mainly on internal matters 
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and agency production and resources. In return, they were given increased free-
dom of action accompanied by a budget guarantee ensured by the MoF (Greve, 
2000; Binderkrantz & Christensen, 2009). This might be called first-generation 
contracting. 
In the early 2000s, references to freedom of action had almost completely 
vanished from contracts, and performance targets focused much more on specific 
target groups; attention to policy demands had risen and new management ideas, 
such as mission statements, had made their way into the contracts (Binderkrantz 
& Christensen, 2009: 74-75). This might be called second-generation contracting. 
In the late 2000s and early 2010s, the contracts are given a more strategic 
focus: they include fewer targets and focus more on outcomes and less on activi-
ties; internal management has also regained a higher status but merely as a sup-
plement to targets related to core tasks. It would therefore appear as though per-
formance contracting in Danish central government has now entered a third gen-
eration. The contracts have moved from negotiated freedom (first generation) to 
very comprehensive and detailed contracts developed in the shadow of the hierar-
chy (second generation), towards contracts characterised by a more strategic, 
long-term approach containing fewer targets. 
Changes in the content of the contracts largely reflect the recommendations 
made by the MoF, which bases its recommendations on experiences from the min-
istries and agencies in central government. Some of these act as first movers and 
inspire the recommendations, whereas others follow them or are inspired by and 
imitate first-mover ministries and agencies. The development process thus seems 
to be affected by experiences with the existing system. When problems with this 
have to be fixed, however, policy makers sometimes look for solutions in other 
ministries and agencies as well as to the institutionalised norms for performance 
management. 
The practical implication of these findings is that the reformers of and actors 
involved in performance management systems must be aware of these dynamics. 
A performance management system is not a stable institution; it changes over 
time, sometimes escalating, at other times de-escalating. It is full of dilemmas that 
must continuously be considered and acted upon. The numbers of targets must 
always be considered, as there is a trade-off between having too few or too many. 
The former might result in measure-fixation or tunnel vision (Smith, 1995; Bevan 
& Hood, 2006), whereas the latter might lead to red tape, non-use of performance 
information and a lack of steering due to target- and information-overload. Simi-
larly, the types of targets included in the contracts must also always be considered. 
Output-oriented targets may be easier to measure but might not provide an ade-
quate picture of the organisation’s performance, possibly leading to measure fix-
ation, suboptimisation, myopia and other kinds of unintended consequences 
(Smith, 1995; Bevan & Hood, 2006). On the other hand, outcome-oriented targets 
might be very difficult to measure or attribute to the specific activities provided 
by the organisation. The drafting of performance contracts is full of dilemmas and 
there will always be disadvantages related to the chosen design, which must be 
continuously considered and reconsidered. 
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Theoretically, the analysis contributes to our knowledge about the dynamics 
inherent to and escalation of performance management systems, as the paper has 
indicated how escalation processes might be reversed and how de-escalation pro-
cesses might also appear. This study has focused on escalation and de-escalation 
processes in the contract content. The other dimensions of a performance manage-
ment system (e.g. interventions, use of performance information and stakeholders 
related to the system) might, however, also be vulnerable for such escalation and 
de-escalation processes and should be uncovered in future studies. 
The analysis has its limitations. While great effort has been made to ensure 
reliability in the time series of data, there is a potential risk for variations in the 
codes, as different coders have been involved over time. Some of the main find-
ings in the development of the contract content seem, however, to be so significant 
that they cannot merely be a result of different interpretations of the coding 
scheme over time. Future studies should further investigate the findings on the 
basis of more solid sets of data in which data is coded by the same coders. It might 
also be interesting to adopt a comparative approach in order to investigate whether 
the performance contracting regime in other (Scandinavian) countries adopts a 
similar development pattern. 
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Appendix 
Table x: Number of specific types of performance targets over time 
  2002 2006 2009 2012 2014 
Case processing time 365 252 33 171 125 
Productivity 122 114 99 34 33 
Activity - - 1491 822 654 
Output 1855 1617 320 252 305 
Quality 238 428 461 140 264 
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Outcome 21 136 465 359 295 
External development 274 39 84 - - 
Internal management 2076 457 105 207 240 
Others 268 338 - - - 
Total 5219 3381 3058 2002 1916 
 
 
Notes 
1 Until autumn of 2011: The Danish Agency for Governmental Management (Økonomistyrelsen). 
2 As different people coded data at different points in time, the coders might have been affected by 
the MBOR discourse in use at the time. The MoF might also have had interests in presenting the use 
of performance contracting in a certain way so as to show how their publications had an impact on 
how performance contracting is carried out. Data from the MoF has primarily been used internally in 
the ministry, however, and has only been published once (Økonomistyrelsen, 2010). The potential 
risk for bias in the coding of data in order to present the use of performance contracting in a manner 
that fits the MoF therefore appears smaller than if data had been published. 
3 The share of activity-oriented targets is statistically significantly larger in 2009 than in 2014, z = 
8.71. 
4 The share of outcome-oriented targets is statistically significantly lower in 2006 than in 2009, z = -
15.44. 
5 The share of productivity-oriented targets does not differ statistically significantly between 2002 
and 2014, z = 1.88. 
6 The share of targets oriented towards internal management is statistically significantly lower in 
2009 than in 2014, z = -13.39. 
7 The share of targets oriented towards internal management is statistically significantly larger in 
2002 than in 2009, z = 26.13. 
8 ‘Externally directed targets’ refers to targets for products and services provided to the organisa-
tion’s environment, which is the opposite of targets related to internal relations within the organisa-
tion (Finansministeriet, 2003: 222). 
 
